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W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Can the U.S. economy generate healthy growth of “good” jobs—
jobs that will ensure a steady improvement in the standard of living 
for the middle class and that will offer a way out of poverty for low-
income Americans? This is the fundamental economic policy challenge 
facing our country in an age of intense global competition. By some 
measures, the U.S. economy appears poised to perform well in the long-
term, whatever its short-term diffi culties. With Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and productivity growth high and unemployment relatively low 
in recent years, key economic indicators suggest a fundamentally strong 
U.S. economy that can withstand downward cyclical pressures. 
Beneath these aggregate statistics, however, are signs that those at 
the bottom and a growing number in the middle are being left behind. 
Rapid globalization and technological progress have brought substantial 
benefi ts to American consumers in the form of better and cheaper goods 
and services. But globalization and technological improvements have 
also been associated with substantial dislocation, stagnant or declining 
real wages and benefi ts, and reduced job security for many workers. 
The gains from economic growth in recent years have accrued primar-
ily to those at the very top of the income distribution, as evidenced by 
the growth of inequality in this country. 
In this book, which was the outgrowth of a conference sponsored by 
the Upjohn Institute in Washington, D.C., in June 2007, leading policy 
analysts frame the major challenges facing U.S. labor policy: 
• Improving the skills of American workers so that they can better 
compete in a global economy; 
• Addressing the crisis in our system of employer-sponsored health 
insurance; 
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• Minimizing the effects of dislocation due to immigration and 
trade; 
• Removing barriers to employment for older workers; 
• Improving the quality of jobs for low-wage workers without 
harming the competitiveness of American companies; 
• Addressing the serious employment barriers of the disadvan-
taged. 
Each chapter in this volume tackles one of these policy challenges, 
identifying the key problems, evaluating the effectiveness of current 
policy approaches, and offering innovative, forward-thinking, but prag-
matic alternative policies. Collectively, the chapters in this volume of-
fer a clear road map for future labor market policy. 
SIGNS OF TROUBLE FOR U.S. WORKERS
The diffi culty that the United States will have in generating good 
jobs and improving living standards for all Americans is readily appar-
ent in problems already facing middle-class and low-wage workers. 
Growing Inequality 
Wage inequality has widened substantially in recent years. From 
2000 to 2006, average real hourly wages dropped by 0.5 percent for 
those in the fi fth to the fi fteenth percentiles of the wage distribution, 
increased by 3.4 percent for those in the forty-fi fth to fi fty-fi fth percen-
tiles, and rose by 5.9 percent for those in the eighty-fi fth to ninety-fi fth 
percentiles.1 Indeed, this recent increase in inequality is a continuation 
of a general trend evident since the 1980s, during which time wages for 
the middle and lower classes have risen far less than the rate of produc-
tivity growth, and most of the increased wealth generated by produc-
tivity gains has gone to the highest income households. From 1979 to 
2006, hourly wages for the median worker grew only 16 percent in real 
terms, or about 0.5 percent per year.2 In contrast, the U.S. economy’s 
total output per hour over that same period grew 58 percent, or about 
1.7 percent per year.3 Figure 1.1, which shows the growth in real hour-
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ly wages at various percentiles of the overall U.S. wage distribution 
between 1979 and 2006, depicts the increase in inequality.4 Wages at 
the bottom 10 percent of the distribution have actually declined in real 
terms since 1979. Real wage growth has been low for workers between 
the tenth percentile and the eightieth percentile—increasing by less than 
20 percent over this 27-year period—compared to the much more rapid 
wage growth for those at the ninetieth percentile and above. 
Real hourly wage growth of approximately 1.1 percent per year 
from 1979 to 2006 would have been needed for the growth in total com-
pensation to match labor productivity growth over the period.5 Only 
earnings at the ninetieth percentile and above matched or exceeded this 
rate. To understand the extent to which inequality in this country has 
grown, consider the fact that if wages below the ninetieth percentile 
had grown at a rate consistent with productivity growth from 1979 to 
2006, earnings for these workers would have been $734 billion higher 
in 2006.6 This amount represents about 12 percent of all wage and sal-
ary income and about 7 percent of GDP in 2006. 
NOTE: These data are based on our calculations from the CPS-ORG for 1979 and 2006. 
See Note 4 for details.
Figure 1.1  Growth in Wage Inequality in the United States, 1979–2006
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Declining Coverage and Generosity of Benefi ts
Employer-sponsored health insurance has been the foundation of 
the U.S. health insurance system for over 50 years. Yet the fraction of 
the nonelderly population with employer-sponsored health insurance 
has dropped sharply in recent years, accompanying the steep increase 
in health insurance costs. In 2005, health insurance was as costly to 
employers as paid leave, historically the most expensive benefi t (GAO 
2006). From 2000 to 2006, the percentage of fi rms offering health in-
surance benefi ts declined by 8 percentage points, and the percentage of 
the nonelderly adults with employer-sponsored health insurance cov-
erage declined by 5 percentage points. By 2006, only 62 percent of 
the nonelderly population was covered by employer-sponsored health 
insurance. 
The fraction of the working population with retiree health insur-
ance benefi ts similarly has dropped. The largest drop occurred among 
private-sector workers following an accounting rule change in 1993 
that required companies to show future retiree health-benefi t costs as 
liabilities on their fi nancial statements. The fraction of private-sector 
workers working in companies that offer some type of retiree health-
insurance benefi ts has continued to fall since then, however, dropping 
from an estimated 32 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2003 (Buchmuel-
ler, Johnson, and Lo Sasso 2006). Analysts believe that recent changes 
in government accounting rules will lead to a sharp drop in the incidence 
of retiree health-insurance coverage offered to public-sector workers as 
well (Johnson 2006). 
Besides health insurance and paid leave, the primary workplace 
benefi t is a retirement plan. Although the fraction of workers who are 
covered by some retirement plan has not declined in recent years, com-
panies’ shift from traditional defi ned-benefi t to defi ned-contribution re-
tirement plans shifts investment risks to workers. In addition, although 
defi ned benefi t plans are not intrinsically more generous than defi ned 
contribution plans, companies’ shift to defi ned contribution plans typi-
cally has been associated with reduced benefi ts (Ghilarducci and Sun 
2006).
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Less Job Security 
Long-term employment with a single company is becoming less 
common. Mean and median job tenure have declined among men over 
the last 50 years, and the fraction of men in a long-term job (whether it 
be for 10 years or 20) has declined for all age groups, with the decline 
most notable for older men (Farber 2007). Related to this phenomenon, 
there is evidence of a persistent trend towards increased job loss in re-
cent years, especially among more educated and older workers (Farber 
2005). Thus, American workers appear more likely than in the recent 
past to experience dislocation and are more likely to have to make a 
late-in-life job change. 
Sharp Drop in Employment among Low-Educated Men
The employment rates of men of all ages with a high school educa-
tion or less have declined precipitously since the 1980s. Among prime-
age (25–54) white, non-Hispanic men, the employment rate (the per-
centage ratio of employment to population) has dropped by 13 percent-
age points since 1979 among high school dropouts and by 5 percentage 
points among those with only a high school degree.7 Among prime-age 
black men, the employment rate has dropped by 21 percentage points 
for high school dropouts and by 10 percentage points for those with 
only a high school degree.8 The employment rate of prime-age black 
men who had dropped out of high school stood at only 54 percent in 
2006. The sharply declining employment rates among low-educated 
men contrast with the employment rate trend for college-educated men, 
which has changed little over this period. 
Offsetting these large declines in the employment rates of low-
educated men would require signifi cant expansion of employment in 
the U.S. economy. For example, in 1979 the employment rate among 
prime-age, white non-Hispanic men without a high school degree was 
84.6 percent.9 If all prime-age men without a high school degree had 
been employed at that rate in 2006, more than 600,000 additional jobs 
would have been required. Similarly, if all prime-age men with only a 
high school degree in 2006 had been employed at the same rate as that 
experienced by white prime-age men with only a high school degree 
in 1979 (93.5 percent), an additional 2.2 million men would have been 
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employed. Taken together, such an expansion of employment among 
prime-age, less-educated men would require an additional 2.9 million 
jobs, or about a 2 percent expansion of employment in the U.S. econo-
my, if all else remained the same. 
Less-educated men in their 50s, which are traditionally the immedi-
ate preretirement years, have also experienced sharp declines in em-
ployment. From 1979 to 2006, employment rates among men in their 
50s declined by 12 percentage points for high school dropouts and by 
11 percentage points for high school graduates.
Although one might argue that declining employment rates among 
low-educated men refl ect increased employment among women, this 
explanation is insuffi cient. Employment rates for college-educated men 
have not fallen, in spite of the sharp increase in employment among 
college-educated women. Moreover, employment rates among prime-
age, high-school-dropout women have been relatively constant and 
thus would appear to explain none of the sharp drop in employment 
rates among their male counterparts.10 Instead, the fact that employ-
ment rates have remained quite low among prime-age women without a 
high school degree—in spite of the overall high growth in employment 
among other prime-age women and in spite of declining marriage rates 
and welfare reform, which has decreased public support for many of 
these women—suggests insuffi cient employment opportunities for low-
educated women as well. 
FORCES SHAPING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
These problems of growing inequality, declining generosity and 
coverage of benefi ts, reduced job security, and declining employment 
rates among low-educated men are attributable to a range of economic 
and social forces. Widespread involvement of large institutional inves-
tors in the stock market beginning in the 1980s led to greater focus on 
lowering costs to boost short-term earnings and stock prices, which in 
turn contributed to downward pressure on compensation and reduced 
job security. 
Rapid technological advances have also played an important role. 
Developments in health technology have reduced mortality and im-
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proved the quality of life for many Americans. But these advances have 
greatly increased the cost of health care and placed severe strains on our 
employer-fi nanced system of health insurance. 
Economists generally believe that computer technology introduced 
into the workplace in the 1980s and 1990s has favored more-skilled 
workers and helps explain growing inequality. However, by opening up 
the possibility of offshoring many service jobs, the development of the 
Internet and other communications technologies potentially will have 
far-reaching implications for American workers at all skill levels in the 
future. 
Globalization reinforces pressures from fi nancial markets and new 
technology. Recent political and economic reform in China, Eastern 
Europe, and elsewhere has enabled tremendous expansion of trade to 
occur in large sections of the world. Bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements have further paved the way for the expansion of trade. 
These factors—coupled with lower transportation and communications 
costs and fi nancial market pressures on U.S. companies to lower costs 
through offshore outsourcing—have greatly increased the importance 
of trade in the U.S. economy. Figure 1.2 displays the manifestation of 
this trend through U.S. exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
From 1980 to 2006, the combination of exports and imports rose as a 
proportion of GDP in the United States from 20 to 28 percent. Almost 
all of that increase was attributable to the growth of imports, refl ecting 
the steep increase in the U.S. trade defi cit, particularly in the last several 
years (Figure 1.3). While Americans broadly benefi t from lower-priced 
imports, the growth of the global economy has led to substantial worker 
dislocation and placed further downward pressure on many workers’ 
wages. 
At the same time that these economic forces are placing strains on 
middle-class and low-wage workers, institutions that historically have 
helped to mitigate income inequality have signifi cantly weakened. 
Most notable are the decline in the value of the minimum wage and the 
decline in union representation. Before its increase in July 2007, the 
minimum wage had fallen to 77 percent of its real value in 1996, the 
year the minimum wage was last increased.11 Unionization rates have 
continued to fall from their peak in the 1950s. In 2006 just 12 percent 
of all U.S. workers and just 7.4 percent of the private-sector workforce 
belonged to a union. 
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Figure 1.2  The Growing Importance of Trade in the U.S. Economy: 
Imports and Exports as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 1.3  Balance of Trade for Goods and Services
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2005, 2007).
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POLICY ACTION PLAN
To address the problems of inequality and pressures from globaliza-
tion, the contributors to this volume recommend several key reforms of 
labor market policy:
Reform the Delivery of Education and Training
Virtually all agree that improving the skills of our current and future 
workforce is critical to competing in a global economy. Yet, Robert Ler-
man points out, current federal and state policies are overly narrow and 
often counterproductive. According to Lerman, a key problem is that 
the United States lacks comprehensive measures of skills. The common 
focus on school completion and academic test scores leads to policies 
that devote too few resources to productivity-enhancing noncognitive 
skills and occupational skills. The results are poor preparation of many 
workers and an insuffi cient supply of workers for many jobs that are in 
demand and pay good wages. 
Lerman urges the development of education curricula that are more 
closely tied to workplace needs, that meet the diverse learning styles of 
students, and that expand support for vocational training in high schools. 
High school students should be able to achieve occupational qualifi ca-
tions by combining school instruction with well-structured work-based 
learning. The K-12 system should be rewarded for raising noncognitive 
skills and occupational skills, even if some students do not complete 
all of the requirements for admission to a four-year college. The mini-
mal federal budget allocation for apprenticeship programs should be in-
creased. Finally, Lerman recommends changes in fi nancial accounting 
rules so that fi rms count their workforces’ human capital as assets and 
thereby are encouraged to invest more in worker training. 
Reform Health Insurance
Can employers continue to afford health insurance coverage for 
employees and remain competitive in the global economy? The answer 
for a growing number of small and large companies is no. Katherine 
Swartz explains why the current system of employer-sponsored health 
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insurance is ineffi cient and is leading to a downward spiral of coverage 
in our country. Swartz warns that the rapid drop in employer-sponsored 
health insurance coverage adds a new urgency to reform in the fi nanc-
ing of health insurance, and she offers a road map for universal cover-
age based on three principles: 1) everyone should enroll in a health 
plan and pay a minimum amount, 2) additional premiums should be 
collected from individuals in proportion to family income, and 3) com-
panies should contribute to fi nancing the insurance. The Netherlands, 
Germany, and Switzerland have health insurance systems that meet 
these three principles and so offer potential models for a reformed U.S. 
system. The system proposed by Swartz would preserve a central role 
for private health insurance. 
Swartz emphasizes that changing the fi nancing of health insurance 
would change the way health insurance costs are shared but should not 
increase—and possibly would lower—the total amount spent on health 
care. A reformed system could avoid ineffi ciencies that result from lack 
of insurance coverage, increase productivity by allowing individuals to 
switch jobs without losing coverage, increase competitiveness of U.S. 
companies in the global market, and reduce perverse incentives em-
ployers have to contract out work or avoid hiring older workers. 
Expand and Revamp Return-to-Work Programs 
Federal funding of employment and training programs in 2007 is 
about 40 percent lower in real terms than it was a decade ago (Abraham 
and Houseman 2008), while the need for such programs has grown be-
cause of declining job security and a growing population. Failure to 
implement effective return-to-work programs is expensive for soci-
ety, leading to lower employment and greater dependence on public 
assistance. 
In their respective chapters, fi rst Lori Kletzer and then Katharine 
Abraham and Susan Houseman present proposals for expanded em-
ployment and training programs, wage insurance programs, and bet-
ter targeting of government programs to the needs of dislocated and 
older workers. Kletzer recommends expanding the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program, currently limited to manufacturing workers, to in-
clude displaced service-sector workers and also to include additional 
monies for training. The wage-loss insurance program, started in 2002, 
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provides trade-displaced workers over age 50 with up to half the dif-
ference between their old and new wages. Kletzer calls for evaluating 
this program—as Congress stipulated that it should be—and possibly 
extending the program to workers in their 40s. Echoing the call for 
program evaluation, Abraham and Houseman emphasize the need to 
evaluate promising older-worker initiatives being taken at the state lev-
el—including placing older-worker specialists in employment centers, 
instituting outreach for seniors, and providing older workers with basic 
computer skills—to determine their effectiveness and suitability for ex-
pansion at the national level. 
Implement Special Policies for Low-Skilled Workers
The growth in inequality has hit low-skilled workers hardest. Paul 
Osterman calls for a two-pronged approach to improving the quality 
of jobs at the low end. The fi rst is improvement in labor standards: 
continued increases in the minimum wage, protection for unions and 
other forms of worker organization, and tax incentives that promote the 
development of good jobs. The second strategy involves programmatic 
assistance to employers to encourage job upgrading. Osterman propos-
es that the U.S. Department of Labor establish a “Low Wage Challenge 
Fund” to assist employers in improving the skills of their workforce 
and thereby the quality of jobs. The Low Wage Challenge Fund would 
also provide matching funds to states for customized training programs 
oriented toward the low-skill workforce and would provide funding to 
community colleges to increase their involvement with employers and 
the low-skill workforce. 
To boost earnings of the least skilled workers, Steven Raphael pro-
poses expansion of the successful Earned Income Tax Credit. Specifi -
cally, Raphael proposes an expanded EITC for childless adults, with 
liberalization of benefi ts for the poorest married couples. 
The rapid rise in incarceration rates and the precipitous drop in 
employment rates of low-skilled men require special policies to bring 
this growing underclass out of the cycle of crime and poverty and into 
productive employment. In addition to an expanded EITC program, 
Raphael advocates four specifi c policies to reduce barriers to employ-
ment for those with criminal records: 1) removing summary disquali-
fi cations of former inmates from fi nancial assistance for education or 
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other public assistance, 2) basing publicly mandated employment bans 
of former felons from certain jobs on specifi c offenses rather than hav-
ing blanket bans, 3) expunging selected criminal records after a period 
of time, and 4) funding training intermediaries to prepare ex-inmates 
for employment. 
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the policies proposed here balance the need to in-
crease workers’ wages and benefi ts with the need to preserve employ-
ers’ competitiveness. For instance, the health insurance proposals in this 
book would guarantee health insurance coverage for all while lowering 
many employers’ health insurance costs. Expanding the Earned Income 
Tax Credit increases workers’ take-home wages without increasing em-
ployers’ costs. And although the book includes proposals for increases 
in the minimum wage and more protection for unions’ organizing rights, 
the book also includes proposals for greater availability of customized 
training grants to fi rms, which would increase worker productivity and, 
in turn, support higher pay. 
In an era of tight government budgets, can the United States af-
ford to implement the set of policies proposed in this book? We argue 
that any additional government expenditures required by these policies 
represent investments that are necessary to improve the effi ciency and 
equity of the American economy. An education system that addresses 
the diversity of needs of students and prepares them for a range of jobs 
in the workplace is central to increasing American workers’ wages and 
to improving the future competitiveness of our country. The United 
States has the highest per-capita spending on health care in the world, 
yet among developed countries it has the lowest rate of health insurance 
coverage and relatively poor health outcomes (Anderson et al. 2000; 
Anderson and Poullier 1999; Swartz 2008). Although reform of the 
employer-sponsored system of health insurance will require increased 
government expenditures on health care, such reform is essential to im-
prove the effi ciency of health care delivery and lower health care ex-
penditures overall. In some cases, government expenditures to improve 
the effectiveness of certain programs may signifi cantly reduce govern-
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ment expenditures in other program areas. For example, our failure to 
fund and implement effective employment and training programs and 
policies for dislocated workers, older workers, and the poor results in 
high public costs in the form of expensive and extensive dependence 
on public support programs, including Social Security, lower levels of 
employment and tax revenues, and higher crime and health problems. 
Although healthy growth of the aggregate U.S. economy has ac-
companied rapid globalization in recent years, the benefi ts of economic 
expansion have accrued disproportionately to those at the very top of the 
income distribution. Many lower and middle income Americans have 
instead experienced less security and lower employment rates, stagnant 
or falling real wages, and lower benefi t levels. The policies advocated 
in this book would go a long way toward guaranteeing a future of good 
jobs for all Americans. 
Notes
 1. These statistics are based on our analysis of data from the Current Population 
Survey—Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG). We averaged over multiple per-
centiles to minimize the statistical noise for individual percentiles. 
 2. It is sometimes asserted that much of the gap between wage and productivity 
growth can be explained by the growth of the cost of benefi ts such as health insur-
ance (see, for example, Council of Economic Advisers 2007, p. 51). This is largely 
true if we focus on the gap between productivity growth and mean wage growth 
using consistent price defl ators. But the growth of nonwage compensation only 
explains a small portion of the gap between U.S. economic output and measured 
real wage growth for the median worker, or for most workers. For example, in the 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, average real wages 
per hour grew 1.27 percent per year from 1979 to 2005, whereas average real 
compensation (including benefi ts) per hour grew 1.42 percent per year from 1979 
to 2005, a difference of 0.15 percent per year. 
 3. Productivity for the nonfarm business sector grew 2.0 percent per year, according 
to fi gures published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The estimated 1.7 percent 
annual growth rate of productivity for the overall economy adjusts for the lower 
productivity growth in the farm sector, as reported in Dew-Becker and Gordon 
(2005). 
 4. We exclude all observations with imputed earnings, hours, or wages. For workers 
paid by the hour, we use hourly wages. For other workers, we use usual weekly 
earnings divided by usual weekly hours, where available. For workers whose usu-
al weekly hours vary, we use actual weekly hours the previous week. For workers 
whose usual weekly earnings are top-coded, we multiply the top code by 1.4. 
Wage observations are treated as outliers and dropped if the real wage is less 
tb08fogjch1.indd   13 9/10/2008   9:49:28 AM
14   Bartik and Houseman
than $2 per hour or more than $200 per hour in 2004 dollars, defl ated using the 
Consumer Price Index research series produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The percentiles are then calculated over all remaining workers in the CPS-ORG 
sample for each year. The CPS earnings weights are used in calculating the per-
centiles. The reported statistics in the fi gure equal the ratio of the 2006 wage to the 
1979 wage at each percentile. 
 5. Wage growth consistent with productivity growth would be less than 1.7 percent, 
for a couple of reasons. First, total compensation includes benefi ts, such as health 
insurance and retirement plans, whose value grew at a rate greater than 1.7 percent. 
Second, the GDP defl ator used to defl ate real output in the productivity statistics 
grew more slowly than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) defl ator used to calculate 
the real wage trends. The fi rst factor might explain an annual growth difference of 
0.2 percent (see Note 1). The second factor suggests that real wage growth using 
the CPI will be lowered by 0.4 percent per year relative to real productivity statis-
tics using the GDP defl ator. These fi gures come from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data on the CPI research series (BLS 2007) and Bureau of Economic Analysis 
data on the GDP price defl ator, taken from Table 1.1.4 of the National Income and 
Product Accounts (BEA 2007).
 6. These estimates are based on data on earnings or hourly wages and weekly hours 
of work from the outgoing rotation groups in the Current Population Survey in 
1979 and 2006. First, we computed real hourly wages in 2006 consistent with a 
1.1 percent annual growth in real hourly wages from 1979 to 2006 for the fi rst to 
the eighty-ninth percentile. We subtracted from these fi gures the actual wage rates 
in 2006 at each percentile to get the hourly wage increment required for wage 
growth to match productivity growth. The annual earnings increment at each per-
centile was computed as the product of this hourly wage increment, the number of 
workers in each CPS percentile in 2006, the average weekly hours of those in each 
percentile, and 52 (for the number of weeks per year). In computing these fi gures, 
we dropped all observations with imputations for earnings, hours, or wages, and 
excluded wage outliers. Thus, we adjusted these numbers upwards to refl ect the 
ratio between total CPS employment, as measured by the BLS in 2006, and the 
smaller estimated number of weighted CPS workers in our sample. The estimate 
of $734 billion is the sum of this annual earnings increment across the fi rst 89 
percentiles. 
 7. All employment-rate statistics come from our analysis of CPS-ORG data.
 8. Employment rates among low-educated Hispanic men, in contrast, have been 
fairly stable.
 9. The employment rate among prime-age Hispanic men was slightly higher, 85.8 per-
cent, and among black prime-age men signifi cantly lower, 75.0 percent, in 1979.
 10. This may be surprising to some because of the presumed effects of welfare reform 
on labor-force participation among low-educated women. Although the employ-
ment rate among high-school-dropout women aged 25–54 did increase from 45 
percent to 51 percent between 1979 and 2000, it fell back to 47 percent by 2006. 
 11. The new minimum wage law will incrementally increase the federal minimum 
wage from $5.15 to $8.25 by 2009. Assuming a rate of infl ation of about 3 percent 
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per year, the minimum wage would approximately return to its real 1996 value in 
2009. However, without future policy initiatives to increase the nominal minimum 
wage, the real value of the minimum wage would start declining again in 2009.
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